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ABSTRACT
How much can one say with confidence about what constitutes
“the freedom of speech” that Congress shall not abridge? In this
Article, I address that question in the context of the transmission of
speech—specifically, the regulation of Internet access known as net
neutrality. This question has implications both for the future of
economic regulation, as more and more activity involves the
transmission of bits, and for First Amendment interpretation. As for
the latter, the question is what a lawyer or judge can conclude without
having to choose among competing conceptions of speech. How far
can a basic legal toolkit go? Using that toolkit, I find that bare
transmission is not speech under the First Amendment, and that most
forms of manipulation of bits also would not qualify as speech.
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Adopting any of the leading conceptions of the First Amendment
would narrow the range of activities covered by the First Amendment.
But even without choosing among those conceptions we can reach
some meaningful conclusions about the limited application of the
First Amendment to Internet access providers.
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INTRODUCTION
On the central question of what is covered by the Free Speech
1
Clause of the First Amendment, what seems to be settled ground?
Are threats “speech”? What about conduct that may convey a
message (e.g., destroying a lab where animals would be tested)?
Academic commentary and judicial opinions have addressed many of
these boundary questions—discussing, for instance, when threats and
2
conduct are speech under the First Amendment. One question that
has received fairly little attention, however, is the circumstances
under which the transmission of speech is encompassed by “the

1. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech . . . .”).
2. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969) (finding that “threat[s]
of retaliation based on misrepresentation and coercion [are outside] the protection of the First
Amendment”); Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1768 (2004) (“At times the
First Amendment’s boundaries have figured in the case law and academic commentary, as with
the familiar debates about whether obscenity, libel, fighting words, and commercial advertising
are inside or outside the coverage of the First Amendment.”).
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3

freedom of speech.” As more activity occurs online, the transmission
of bits of data—and the legal status of that transmission—becomes
more important. This Article addresses the question of whether, and
how, the First Amendment constrains the government’s ability to
4
impose nondiscrimination rules on the transmitters of those bits.
This question is important in its own right, as First Amendment
5
scrutiny poses significant hurdles to government regulation. To the
extent that the transmission of bits is treated as part of the freedom of
speech, regulation of such transmission will be subject to heightened
judicial scrutiny that will invalidate some regulations that would
6
survive absent First Amendment scrutiny. Simply stated, regulating
transmitters of bits will become much more difficult. The
ramifications of such judicial scrutiny will increase over time: with
each passing year, more aspects of our lives are encapsulated as bits
traveling through wires and over the airwaves.
The question addressed in this Article also highlights larger
issues about the nature of legal interpretation, and interpretation of
the Free Speech Clause in particular. That clause has been subject to
endless debate, with commentators finding little common ground.
Theorists have put forward a multitude of conceptions of the Free
Speech Clause, each of which values—and thus treats as speech
covered by the clause—different forms of communication. Those
who, for example, think the Free Speech Clause is best understood as
a protection of personal autonomy see the clause as encompassing
and protecting a very different set of communications from those who

3. In this article, I will use the term “freedom of speech” to refer to the freedom protected
by the Free Speech Clause. That is, I will be using it in a specific legal context, not as a broader
philosophical term. To avoid visual clutter, in most instances I will refer to the freedom of
speech without quotation marks. By contrast, I will use the term “speech” to refer to its usage in
the Free Speech Clause only when I so indicate.
4. For the purposes of this Article, I am focusing on the speech interests of Internet access
providers—the entities that provide Internet service to customers. These companies have been
the main opponents of net neutrality regulations and the main ones invoking the First
Amendment against such regulations. Others in the Internet ecosystem—most notably,
customers—have a different set of interests, and I do not address them in this Article.
5. The First Amendment encompasses more than the Free Speech Clause, of course. For
the purposes of this Article, when I refer to the First Amendment I am referring to its Free
Speech Clause component.
6. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1370 (1998) (“[T]he First Amendment has become the
preferred constitutional assault vehicle for telecommunications companies challenging
government regulation.”). For a discussion of judicial scrutiny of speech regulations, see infra
notes 24–25 and accompanying text.

BENJAMIN IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC

1676

4/14/2011 6:03:53 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:1673

see it as checking government power or enhancing democratic
7
deliberation. The result is that there is no agreement about what is
outside the realm of the freedom of speech. One or more theories
8
9
10
would treat computer code, maps, and sex as speech under the First
Amendment. It is difficult, if not impossible, to refute one or another
conception of what the freedom of speech really means. This is not to
suggest that there is no basis upon which one could choose one
conception or another, but rather that the basis for choosing one—
and for rejecting others—is heavily dependent on values and goals
that do not submit to proof. That is, the arguments for these
conceptions do not, by and large, depend on steps that can be refuted.
Thus, in the realm of theory, the answer to the question of what
constitutes the freedom of speech depends on the conception one
adopts, and one’s choice of conception is more analogous to a purely
subjective preference than to a conclusion reached by a series of
falsifiable steps.

7. See infra notes 54–56 and accompanying text. The question of what is encompassed by
the First Amendment is different from the question of what is protected by the First
Amendment. Some speech that is included within the freedom of speech—and thus covered by
the First Amendment—may not be protected from regulation. Secret battle plans, for instance,
are speech for First Amendment purposes, but courts, and many theorists, would nonetheless
permit the regulation of their distribution. This Article focuses on the question of coverage—
what the First Amendment encompasses. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A
PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 89–92 (1982) (discussing the distinction between First Amendment
coverage and protection); Schauer, supra note 2, at 1771 (“Questions about the boundaries of
the First Amendment are not questions of strength—the degree of protection that the First
Amendment offers—but rather are questions of scope—whether the First Amendment applies
at all.”).
8. See Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1147 (9th Cir. 1999) (concluding
that “encryption software, in its source code form and as employed by those in the field of
cryptography, must be viewed as expressive for First Amendment purposes”), reh’g en banc
granted and opinion withdrawn, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999); Schauer, supra note 2, at 1794
(“The anti-Microsoft and anti-Hollywood claims of the open-source movement focus on the way
in which computer source codes can be conceived of as a language and therefore as
speech . . . .”); Lee Tien, Publishing Software as a Speech Act, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 629,
664–65 (2000) (arguing that using computer code is participating in scientific discourse and,
therefore, is speech under the First Amendment).
9. See Schauer, supra note 2, at 1801–02 (suggesting that maps satisfy at least one of Kent
Greenawalt’s four factors for First Amendment coverage because they are speech that is
“general rather than [related] to a specific transaction”).
10. See C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L.
REV. 964, 1017–18 (1978) (arguing that “sexual behavior between consenting adults” is
encompassed by the First Amendment); Schauer, supra note 2, at 1794 (“[T]he sexual liberty
and antipaternalism claims of those who object to laws restricting sexual conduct typically focus
on those aspects of the sex industry . . . that can be conceptualized as involving free speech
issues.”).
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The aim of this Article is to see how far legal scholarship can
go—and, concomitantly, where it cannot go—relying only on broadly
accepted sources and forms of reasoning. This, in turn, raises an
anterior question: what are those broadly accepted sources and forms
of reasoning? This could be the subject of a book in its own right, but
I will utilize some basic tools of legal analysis—text, history, Supreme
Court jurisprudence, basic analogical reasoning, and widely accepted
conceptions. How far can these tools take us?
One way of understanding this Article is that it addresses the
extent to which lawyers can reach any meaningful conclusions about
what the freedom of speech encompasses by relying on a basic legal
toolkit and broadly shared principles. Do lawyers and judges need to
adopt a particular conception of the First Amendment in order to
11
decide what the freedom of speech encompasses? Part of the
significance of this question arises from the fact that this approach
approximates the position of the Supreme Court. Text, history,
Supreme Court jurisprudence, basic analogical reasoning, and widely
accepted conceptions are not only lawyers’ but also the Supreme
Court’s basic toolkit. And the Court has never settled upon a
conception of the First Amendment. The Court has invoked the
marketplace of ideas more than any other conception of the First
Amendment, but different cases have emphasized different
conceptions, and in many cases the Court has refrained from choosing
12
among them. This is not surprising: each possible conception of the
11. See Robert Post, Encryption Source Code and the First Amendment, 15 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 713, 716 (2000) (“[Another theorist] is fundamentally misguided to believe that he
can explain First Amendment coverage ‘without appealing to a grand theoretical framework of
First Amendment values.’ If First Amendment coverage does not extend to all speech acts, then
such a framework is at a minimum necessary in order to provide the criteria by which to select
the subset of speech acts that merit constitutional attention.” (quoting Tien, supra note 8, at
636)).
12. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the purpose of the
First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail . . . .”); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557,
573–74 (1995) (emphasizing the centrality of autonomy to the First Amendment); Turner
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (“At the heart of the First
Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for himself or herself the ideas
and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence.”); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 n.11 (1978) (“Freedom of expression has particular significance with
respect to government because ‘[i]t is here that the state has a special incentive to repress
opposition and often wields a more effective power of suppression.’” (alteration in original)
(quoting THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 9
(1966))); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (“[A] major purpose of [the First]
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”); Robert Post,
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First Amendment can be subjected to legitimate criticism, and
reaching agreement at that level of specificity is difficult for any
group, Justices or otherwise. The Supreme Court’s First Amendment
jurisprudence is thus one of the many areas characterized by
13
incompletely theorized agreements.
One can thus fairly present the question addressed by this
Article as whether conventional legal analysis can meaningfully guide
the Supreme Court in applying the First Amendment to the
14
transmission of bits. In this Article, I suggest an affirmative answer. I
find that the basic legal toolkit counsels against treating the freedom
of speech as encompassing the application of nondiscrimination rules
to transmitters of speech. There is fairly little support for treating a
company’s transmission, standing alone, as speech for First
Amendment purposes, and there are strong reasons to reach the
opposite conclusion. The same tools indicate that some forms of
editing will trigger the First Amendment, and they provide a
significant amount of guidance in determining what form that editing
must take.
That said, none of the arguments I present are ineluctable. If we
cannot have confidence in analysis that proceeds from widely
accepted premises and uses widely accepted tools, what should that
tell us? That we can never have confidence in our interpretations of
the First Amendment, or that we must wait for the Supreme Court to
weigh in? That the Supreme Court, in turn, must either choose a
specific conception of the First Amendment or make an essentially
arbitrary decision, because conventional legal analysis without a
specific conception provides no meaningful guidance?

Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2353,
2372–73 (2000) (noting that the Supreme Court has not consistently followed any one theory of
the First Amendment).
13. See Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 48 (“Many judges are
minimalists; they want to say and do no more than necessary to resolve cases. . . . [Minimalists]
attempt to reach incompletely theorized agreements, in which the most fundamental questions
are left undecided. They prefer outcomes and opinions that can attract support from people
with a wide range of theoretical positions, or with uncertainty about which theoretical positions
are best. In these ways, minimalist judges avoid the largest questions about the meaning of the
free speech guarantee, or the extent of the Constitution’s protection of ‘liberty,’ or the precise
scope of the President’s authority as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.” (footnote
omitted)).
14. This is different, of course, from the question of whether such analysis—as opposed to
other considerations—will actually persuade Justices. Whatever does, in fact, motivate Justices,
my question here is how much work conventional legal analysis can do.
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Part I briefly describes what is at stake, noting the net neutrality
context in which this issue arises and the larger First Amendment
backdrop. If the First Amendment applies to all regulations of bit
transmitters, an increasingly large part of the economy will be subject
to heightened judicial scrutiny. Part II considers the applicability of
the Free Speech Clause to a company’s transmission of speech,
standing alone. It finds that neither traditional interpretive tools nor
any of the proffered conceptions of the First Amendment support the
idea that bare transmission is part of the freedom of speech. Part III
asks what manipulation of bits by Internet access providers would
constitute speech under the First Amendment, and finds that widely
accepted premises and sources—in particular, precedents and an
overinclusive definition of “communication”—can provide a fair
amount of guidance, revealing that most of the activities of Internet
access providers fall outside the scope of the freedom of speech.
I. THE STAKES
The question of First Amendment coverage on which this article
focuses arises in the immediate context of Internet access and net
neutrality—to oversimplify greatly, the proposition that the
government should prevent broadband Internet access providers
from engaging in unreasonable discrimination in their treatment of
15
Internet traffic. The meaning of this formulation depends on the
definition of unreasonable discrimination, and there has been a
robust debate as to which actions by Internet access providers should
16
be prohibited and which should be permitted. The starting position
for net neutrality proponents is “that the Internet has thrived because
of its freedom and openness—the absence of any gatekeeper blocking
17
lawful uses of the network or picking winners and losers online.”
Their concern is that the companies that provide Internet access have
the incentive and ability to block, degrade, or prioritize particular
content, applications, services, or devices based on payments or other

15. There are various terms that can be used to describe the entities involved.
“[B]roadband Internet access service provider” is the full term that the FCC used in its order on
the open Internet and net neutrality. See Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905, 52
Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) 1, 49 (Dec. 21, 2010) (report and order). As a convenient shorthand in
this Article, I will refer to “Internet access providers.”
16. See, e.g., Tim Wu & Christopher S. Yoo, Keeping the Internet Neutral?: Tim Wu and
Christopher Yoo Debate, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 575 (2007) (debating net neutrality).
17. Preserving the Open Internet, 52 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) at 3.
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18

considerations. In December 2010, the Federal Communications
19
Commission (FCC) issued a lengthy report and order staking out its
20
own position on net neutrality.
Some commentators have addressed the First Amendment issues
raised by net neutrality regulations. Some have contended that net
neutrality regulations do not trigger Internet access providers’ free
speech interests, but their arguments have generally placed heavy
emphasis on conceptions of the First Amendment that are not
21
broadly shared. Rejecting the application of the First Amendment to
regulation of Internet access providers has thus depended on the
acceptance of a particular vision of the First Amendment. Most
commentators who have addressed the issue have contended that
Internet access providers’ First Amendment rights are implicated by
net neutrality regulations, and have focused on how First
22
Amendment scrutiny would apply to such regulations. Their
18. Id. at 8–13; see also id. at 8 (identifying “three [basic] types of Internet activities:
providing broadband Internet access service; providing content, applications, services, and
devices accessed over or connected to broadband Internet access service (‘edge’ products and
services); and subscribing to a broadband Internet access service that allows access to edge
products and services”).
19. Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905, 52 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) 1 (Dec.
21, 2010) (report and order).
20. The FCC order, inter alia, prohibits a fixed Internet access provider from
“unreasonably discriminat[ing] in transmitting lawful network traffic over a consumer’s
broadband Internet access service,” but exempts “[r]easonable network management” from this
prohibition. Id. at 23–24. It defines reasonable network management as:
ensuring network security and integrity, including by addressing traffic that is harmful
to the network; addressing traffic that is unwanted by end users (including by premise
operators), such as by providing services or capabilities consistent with an end user’s
choices regarding parental controls or security capabilities; and reducing or mitigating
the effects of congestion on the network.
Id. at 28 (footnotes omitted). And it states that “a commercial arrangement between a
broadband provider and a third party to directly or indirectly favor some traffic over other
traffic in the broadband Internet access service connection to a subscriber of the broadband
provider (i.e., ‘pay for priority’) would raise significant cause for concern.” Id. at 25.
21. See, e.g., Marvin Ammori, Beyond Content Neutrality: Understanding Content-Based
Promotion of Democratic Speech, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 273, 303 (2009) (“Government attempts
to promote democratic content should be subject to a viewpoint-neutral test, not content
analysis. The most widely accepted values underlying the First Amendment support this
conclusion, and potential objections do not undermine it.”); Bill D. Herman, Opening
Bottlenecks: On Behalf of Mandated Network Neutrality, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 103, 112 (2006)
(“First Amendment values are best upheld by ensuring media diversity—not merely content
diversity, but a diversity of stakeholders who have editorial control over that content.”).
22. See, e.g., Rob Frieden, Invoking and Avoiding the First Amendment: How Internet
Service Providers Leverage Their Status as Both Content Creators and Neutral Conduits, 12 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 1279, 1321 (2010) (asserting that Internet service providers (ISPs) are First
Amendment speakers when they operate in a non-neutral way); Randolph J. May, Net
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assumption seems to be that the precedents applicable to cable
23
television operators obviously apply to Internet access providers. In
this Article, I find that any such assumption is too facile.
This Article uses the example of net neutrality regulation to
consider the contexts in which bit transmitters’ First Amendment
interests might be implicated. I consider the kinds of activities that
broadband access providers might want to engage in but that might
be limited by net neutrality regulation.
Net neutrality is only one example, however, of the larger
question that this Article addresses—the circumstances under which
transmitters of speech are engaged in speech for First Amendment
purposes. Net neutrality regulations raise this question, but it can and
likely will arise in a variety of contexts.
Those contexts become more numerous and more important
with each passing year. The continual increase in online activity
means that more activity takes the form of bits traveling through
wires and the airwaves. Applying the First Amendment to the
transmission of bits would mean significant judicial scrutiny of a
bigger and bigger part of the economy. Regulations that trigger the
Free Speech Clause are reviewed under intermediate scrutiny at a
minimum, and strict scrutiny in many contexts. Under strict scrutiny,
applicable to content-based regulation of speech, the government
interest must be “compelling” and the statute must be the least
24
restrictive means to further the articulated interest —a test that is
rarely satisfied. Intermediate scrutiny applies to content-neutral
Neutrality Mandates: Neutering the First Amendment in the Digital Age, 3 ISJLP 197, 202–09
(2007) (discussing the different ways in which the First Amendment applies to net neutrality
regulation); Moran Yemini, Mandated Network Neutrality and the First Amendment: Lessons
from Turner and a New Approach, 13 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 21 (2008) (“[C]lassifying networkneutrality rules as content neutral and therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny is not a hard
case.”).
23. See Frieden, supra note 22, at 1313 (“As a threshold matter, ISPs qualify for some
degree of First Amendment protection in their capacity as content packagers, in much the same
way as cable television operators load channels of content onto various programming tiers of
service.”); May, supra note 22, at 202–03 (“Like newspapers, magazines, cable operators, movie
and music producers, and even the man or woman preaching on a soapbox, ISPs such as
Comcast and Verizon possess free speech rights.”); Yemini, supra note 22, at 21–22 (“The
Court’s line of reasoning in differentiating between cable and broadcast, on the one hand, and
between cable and newspapers, on the other hand, seems applicable also to [broadband service
providers] in the context of network neutrality.”).
24. See, e.g., Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (“The
Government may . . . regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to
promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated
interest.”).
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regulation of speech and is more frequently satisfied. But
intermediate scrutiny is still a serious undertaking. The challenged
regulation must serve an “important or substantial governmental
interest” unrelated to the suppression of speech and cannot burden
25
substantially more speech than is necessary to further that interest.
This is much more rigorous review than ordinary economic
regulation is subject to. The constitutional review of economic
regulation is very forgiving, and indeed it is hard for the government
to lose. Review of agency regulations under the Administrative
26
Procedure Act has more bite, but it is still much less rigorous than
intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment.
Thus what is at stake is whether a growing part of our economy
and society—the transmission of bits—will be subject to scrutiny that
will invalidate many ordinary forms of regulation. Note that courts
could reduce the chances of such invalidation by softening
intermediate scrutiny—or even creating a new, weaker form of
scrutiny for the transmission of bits. But before courts start tinkering
with the levels of scrutiny, they should ask whether the relevant
activities are covered by the Free Speech Clause in the first place. Of
course, if that is what the First Amendment calls for, then so be it.
But is that what the First Amendment calls for?
II. TRANSMITTERS OF SPEECH
If a company acts as a pure transmitter of speech—simply
moving the speech from A to B without editing the speech or
exercising a preference among speakers—is it engaging in speech for
First Amendment purposes? Assume for the purposes of this Part
that the company acts as a nondiscriminatory transmitter and makes
no editorial choices, and that the relevant laws require such
nondiscriminatory transmission but impose no further regulation on
transmission. Is the mere act of transmission a form of speech, such
that any regulation of it implicates the Free Speech Clause?
25. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994) (“[A]
content-neutral regulation will be sustained if ‘it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.’” (quoting United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 377 (1968))).
26. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006) (“The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law[.]”).
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A. The Difficulties with an Argument that Pure Transmission Is
Speech
The best argument in favor of applying the First Amendment to
nondiscrimination regulation of bit transmitters is that the text
compels it: the transmission of bits is speech, and thus any regulation
of bit transmitters implicates the First Amendment. This contention
does not take the analysis very far. At the outset, it bears noting that
the Free Speech Clause prohibits abridgement of “the freedom of
27
speech,” not “speech” standing alone. And, needless to say, neither
“speech” nor “the freedom of speech” is a self-defining term. This is a
perennial problem with textual analysis of the Free Speech Clause: as
a textual matter, “speech” and “the freedom of speech” could be
interpreted in any of a variety of ways. Everyone might agree on
some core elements, but the textual boundaries of these terms are not
28
apparent.
Tools of originalism also are of limited help in determining the
meaning of “the freedom of speech.” As Leonard Levy noted more
than half a century ago, “The meaning of no other clause of the Bill
of Rights at the time of its framing and ratification has been [as]
29
obscure to us” as the Free Speech Clause. That said, the materials

27. See John Paul Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE L.J. 1293, 1296 (1993) (“I
emphasize the word ‘the’ as used in the term ‘the freedom of speech’ because the definite article
suggests that the draftsmen intended to immunize a previously identified category or subset of
speech. That category could not have been co-extensive with the category of oral
communications that are commonly described as ‘speech’ in ordinary usage.”); WILLIAM W.
VAN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 24–26 (1984) (emphasizing the
importance of determining whether some claimed speech is part of the freedom of speech).
28. Akhil Amar has argued that intratextualism—identifying terms appearing in different
parts of the Constitution and interpreting them to have similar meanings—illuminates the
meaning of “speech” under the Free Speech Clause. In particular, he contends that the term
“speech” in the Speech or Debate Clause, which provides that senators and representatives
“shall not be questioned in any other Place” for “any Speech or Debate in either House,” U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 6, applies only to political speech, and thus we should interpret the Free Speech
Clause to cover only, or at least primarily, political speech. Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism,
112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 815 (1999). For my purposes, it bears noting that Amar’s interpretation
of the First Amendment is widely contested, but that, if it were adopted, it would almost
certainly doom any claim that a company’s transmission of speech is covered by the Free Speech
Clause. See generally Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Commentary, Hercules, Herbert,
and Amar: The Trouble with Intratextualism, 113 HARV. L. REV. 730 (2000) (criticizing Amar’s
intratextualism).
29. LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN
EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 4 (1960); see also Stanley C. Brubaker, Original Intent and
Freedom of Speech and Press, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT
UNDERSTANDING 82, 85 (Eugene W. Hickok, Jr. ed., 1991) (“The debates in Congress
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that we do have from the Framing era suggest that those in the
Framing generation had a narrower conception of the freedom of
speech than do modern courts, and many in the Framing generation
adhered to Blackstone’s position that the freedom of speech was best
30
understood as a freedom from prior restraints. Beyond that, the
Framing generation emphasized that the freedom of speech was a
31
personal right applicable to individuals. It is not at all clear how far,
if at all, the Framing generation would have applied the freedom of
32
speech to corporations.
We can look to analogical reasoning—probably the most widely
33
accepted form of legal reasoning. Analogies can be revealing and
concerning the speech and press clauses shed scant light on the question of meaning. . . . Nor do
we find enlightening comments in the state legislatures that considered the amendments or the
local newspapers or pamphlets of the time.”).
30. See, e.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, JEFFERSON & CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE DARKER SIDE 46
(1963) (“Jefferson, by contrast, never protested against the substantive law of seditious libel . . . .
He accepted without question the dominant view of his generation that government could be
criminally assaulted merely by the expression of critical opinions that allegedly tended to
subvert it by lowering it in the public’s esteem.”); LEVY, supra note 29, at vii (“The evidence
drawn particularly from the period 1776 to 1791 indicates that the generation that
framed . . . the First Amendment was hardly as libertarian as we have traditionally assumed.”);
Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 22
(1971) (“In colonial times and during and after the Revolution [early political leaders] displayed
a determination to punish speech thought dangerous to government, much of it expression that
we would think harmless and well within the bounds of legitimate discourse.”); G. Edward
White, Historicizing Judicial Scrutiny, 57 S.C. L. REV. 1, 60, 60 n.294 (2005) (“Since the First
Amendment only applied against Congress, this approach assumed that the federal government
could punish seditious, libelous, blasphemous, obscene, or indecent speech with impunity so
long as it did not censor the speech in advance.”); see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *151 (“The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state:
but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from
censure for criminal matter when published.”).
31. See, e.g., Julian N. Eule, Promoting Speaker Diversity: Austin and Metro Broadcasting,
1990 SUP. CT. REV. 105, 129 (“The framers of the First Amendment could scarcely have
anticipated its application to the corporate form. That, of course, ought not to be dispositive.
What is compelling, however, is an understanding of who was supposed to be the beneficiary of
the free speech guaranty—the individual.”).
32. Compare Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 950 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (“Unlike our colleagues, [the Framers] had little trouble
distinguishing corporations from human beings, and when they constitutionalized the right to
free speech in the First Amendment, it was the free speech of individual Americans that they
had in mind.”), with id. at 928 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he individual person’s right to speak
includes the right to speak in association with other individual persons. . . . The association of
individuals in a business corporation . . . cannot be denied the right to speak on the simplistic
ground that it is not ‘an individual American.’”).
33. See LLOYD L. WEINREB, LEGAL REASON: THE USE OF ANALOGY IN LEGAL
ARGUMENT 96 (2005) (stating that “analogical reasoning is not a convenience but a necessity”
in the law).
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can legitimately lead lawyers and judges to reject some arguments.
If, for instance, under some interpretation the freedom of speech
would apply to most business decisions, that interpretation would be
problematic. The First Amendment, after all, flatly prohibits any
abridgement of the freedom of speech, and interpreting the text to
apply that prohibition to most business decisions does not seem to be
35
a faithful interpretation, under any meaning of the term faithful. Just
as it would misshape and demean the religion clauses of the First
Amendment to find that “religion” encompassed every belief, it
would misshape and demean the First Amendment to find that the
freedom of speech encompassed every act that relates to information.
“[T]he freedom of speech” is a broad and powerful term, but an
interpretation that leaves little outside of its ambit is an implausible
one, as a matter of textual construction.
In this case, analogical reasoning highlights the implausibility of
an interpretation of the Free Speech Clause that bare transmission is
speech. Imagine that FedEx decided to speed up the delivery of
documents addressed to companies with which it had a financial
relationship; that is, FedEx would give preferential treatment in its
delivery schedule to documents sent to companies that paid it for the
privilege. A congressional decision to ban such a practice may or may
not be good policy, but it would not seem to raise First Amendment
issues. Yes, FedEx would be moving First Amendment-protected
materials—documents—from one user to another, but it is hard to see
how transporting documents turns a company into a speaker for First
Amendment purposes. More precisely, the freedom of speech would
not seem to encompass FedEx’s business model. A company devoted
to transporting messages with which it agreed—imagine a courier
service that limited itself to communications between Republican- or
Democratic-affiliated groups—would be a different matter. In that

34. See id. at 97 (“[I]f the reasons for a rule are not substantial, that may suggest that the
analogy supporting its application is weak and that some other analogy pointing to a different
rule is to be preferred. Or, if the analogy is weak, that may suggest that less weight should be
given to the reasons for the rule to which the analogy points.”); see also Emily Sherwin, A
Defense of Analogical Reasoning in Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1179, 1196 (1999) (remarking that
the important part of analogical reasoning is “the sense of obligation to study prior cases and
either conform to them or explain why they should be disregarded”); Cass R. Sunstein, On
Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 775 (1993) (“Principles [of law] are . . . both
generated and tested through confrontation with particular cases.”).
35. For two different discussions of faithful interpretation of the Constitution, see generally
PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982); and
SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1989).
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situation, the act of transmission would entail a communication: “We,
the Republican [or Democratic] delivery service, are bringing you a
document from a kindred spirit.” But for a company like FedEx that
does not so limit itself, there is no similar communication. The arrival
of a FedEx truck gives no one any information about the content of
36
the relevant document.
Importantly, the argument that transmission equals speech
would apply not only to ordinary carriers like FedEx but also to
common carriers that carry speech. The obvious example is local
telephone companies. They carry central forms of speech—
conversations. If regulation of speech transmitters really does
implicate the Free Speech Clause, then most (if not all) regulations of
common carriers would trigger First Amendment scrutiny that would
likely invalidate many of them.
There is nothing, as a matter of logic, that would prohibit the
application of the First Amendment to the regulation of common
carriers. But it would fly in the face of history and the consistent legal
treatment of such carriers. The longstanding historical practice and
understanding was that common carriers of speech were mere
transmitters who were not speakers for purposes of the First
37
Amendment. As a jurisprudential matter, the Supreme Court has
never suggested First Amendment coverage for bits qua bits, or for all
speech transmitters. The Court has applied the First Amendment
only to people or companies who do much more than merely
38
transport. No court has ever suggested that regulation of such
carriage triggers First Amendment scrutiny. On the contrary, courts
have long treated common carriage regimes as not raising First
Amendment issues. Courts have placed common carriers and other
mere conduits at the opposite end of the spectrum from speakers, and

36. A regulation that discriminated against the transmission of political speech, or speech
on behalf of a political party, would trigger the application of the First Amendment. But the
problem would be the government seeking to suppress speech based on its content or viewpoint,
and that would occur whether the underlying activity was the transmission of speech or the
transmission of electricity.
37. See, e.g., Ellis v. Am. Tel. Co., 95 Mass. (13 Allen) 226, 231–32 (1866) (“[A]n owner or
manager of [a telegraph] line becomes to a certain extent a public servant or agent. . . . He
cannot refuse to receive and forward despatches; nor can he select the persons for whom he will
act . . . . He is required to send [messages] for every person who may apply, at a usual or
uniform tariff or rate, without any undue preference, and according to established regulations
applicable to all alike.”).
38. See infra notes 60–68 and accompanying text.
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have held that conduits do not have free speech rights of their own.
Indeed, even the dissent in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC
40
(Turner I), which would have invalidated on First Amendment
grounds a statute requiring cable operators to carry some
broadcasters, suggested common carriage for cable operators as an
alternative that would not run afoul of the First Amendment: “[I]t
stands to reason that if Congress may demand that telephone
companies operate as common carriers, it can ask the same of cable
companies; such an approach would not suffer from the defect of
41
preferring one speaker to another.” Common carriers’ main First

39. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 739 (1996)
(plurality opinion) (contrasting editors and common carriers for First Amendment purposes);
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 655 (1994) (“Given cable’s long history
of serving as a conduit for broadcast signals, there appears little risk that cable viewers would
assume that the broadcast stations carried on a cable system convey ideas or messages endorsed
by the cable operator.”); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 378 (1984)
(distinguishing between broadcasters and common carriers for First Amendment purposes);
Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980) (rejecting a shopping center owner’s
challenge to a state law preventing the owner from restricting messages expressed on its
property because the shopping center is “a business establishment that is open to the public”
and, thus, “[t]he views expressed by members of the public in passing out pamphlets or seeking
signatures for a petition . . . will not likely be identified with those of the owner”).
40. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622 (1994). Turner I was a First
Amendment challenge to the “must carry” provisions, which require cable operators to carry
local television broadcasters. Id. at 626.
41. Id. at 684 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The most the Court
has been willing to say is that applying the First Amendment to a regulation treating cable
operators (who do have speech rights) as common carriers “is not frivolous.” FCC v. Midwest
Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 709 n.19 (1979) (“The court below suggested that the Commission’s
rules might violate the First Amendment rights of cable operators. Because our decision rests
on statutory grounds, we express no view on that question, save to acknowledge that it is not
frivolous and to make clear that the asserted constitutional issue did not determine or sharply
influence our construction of the statute.”).
In Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989), a case
invalidating statutory restrictions on telephone companies’ carriage of indecent telephone
messages, Justice Scalia, writing for himself in a concurrence, stated that “while we hold the
Constitution prevents Congress from banning indecent speech in this fashion, we do not hold
that the Constitution requires public utilities to carry it.” Id. at 133 (Scalia, J., concurring). In a
similar vein, several lower courts rejected First Amendment challenges to telephone companies’
decisions not to carry indecent messages on the grounds that the telephone companies were not
state actors. See Info. Providers’ Coal. for Def. of the First Amendment v. FCC, 928 F.2d 866,
877 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Carriers are private companies, not state actors[,] and accordingly are not
obliged to continue, restrict or terminate the services of particular subscribers. Thus, a carrier is
free under the Constitution to terminate service to dial-a-porn operators altogether.” (citation
omitted)); Carlin Commc’ns, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 827 F.2d 1291, 1297 (9th
Cir. 1987) (“The question is whether state action also inhered in Mountain Bell’s decision to
adopt a policy excluding all ‘adult entertainment’ from the 976 network. We hold that it did
not.”); Carlin Commc’n, Inc. v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 802 F.2d 1352, 1361–62 (11th Cir. 1986)
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Amendment success—their challenges to 47 U.S.C. § 533(b)—is also
42
instructive on this point. Neither the common carriers challenging
the statute nor any of the courts (all of which accepted their
arguments) suggested that the First Amendment applied to telephone
common carriage service. Instead, the companies argued, and the
courts held, that the First Amendment applied to a statutory
provision that prevented common carriers from “providing video
43
programming.”
Turning to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, the Court has
never held that the fact that an entity transmits speech means that
regulation of such a transmitter is a regulation of the freedom of
speech. Notably, in the 2006 case Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic
44
and Institutional Rights, Inc., the Court stated that “it has never been
deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a
course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part
initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either
45
spoken, written, or printed.” The Court emphasized that “we have
extended First Amendment protection only to conduct that is
46
inherently expressive,” and it has articulated a two-part test for

(finding no state action); see also Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 825
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Common carriers are private entities
and may, consistent with the First Amendment, exercise editorial discretion in the absence of a
statutory prohibition.”). None of these points bears on the question whether a regulatory
prohibition on common carriers’ exercise of editorial discretion implicates the First
Amendment. As I discuss in Part III, any carrier or provider can be a speaker for First
Amendment purposes if it communicates messages through its manipulation of bits. The issue
addressed in this Article is the contexts in which Internet access providers are engaged in such
communications.
42. See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 § 613(b), 47 U.S.C. § 533(b) (1994)
(repealed 1996) (prohibiting any common carrier from directly or indirectly providing video
programming to its subscribers).
43. US West, Inc. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1092, 1102 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting US W., Inc.
v. United States, 855 F. Supp. 1184, 1191 (W.D. Wash. 1994)), vacated, 516 U.S. 1155 (1996); see
also Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181, 190 (4th Cir. 1994)
(“It is clear that the provision of cable television service is a form of ‘speech’ protected by the
First Amendment.”), vacated, 516 U.S. 415 (1996).
44. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
45. Id. at 62 (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
46. Id. at 66; see also City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989) (“It is possible to find
some kernel of expression in almost every activity a person undertakes—for example, walking
down the street or meeting one’s friends at a shopping mall—but such a kernel is not sufficient
to bring the activity within the protection of the First Amendment.”); United States v. O’Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (“We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of
conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to
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determining when particular actions constitute speech: “In deciding
whether particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative
elements to bring the First Amendment into play, we have asked
whether ‘[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present,
and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be
47
understood by those who viewed it.’” The transmission of bits fails
this test. Mere transmission does not reveal an intent to convey a
message, and no message is likely to be understood.
Those arguing for application of the First Amendment to mere
transmitters focus on the proposition that the transmitters’ service is
equivalent to the programming choices made by cable operators and
thus is covered by the Supreme Court’s statement in Turner I that
cable programmers and cable operators engage in speech protected
48
by the First Amendment. Crucially, nothing in Turner I suggests that
mere transmission constitutes speech for First Amendment purposes;
in fact the opinion suggests the opposite. The key quotation from
Turner I is illuminating:
Cable programmers and cable operators engage in and transmit
speech, and they are entitled to the protection of the speech and
press provisions of the First Amendment. Through “original
programming or by exercising editorial discretion over which
stations or programs to include in its repertoire,” cable programmers

express an idea.”); Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993) (quoting this language from
O’Brien with approval); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (same). The quoted
language from Rumsfeld, in focusing on conduct alone, has been subject to some criticism. See
Dale Carpenter, Unanimously Wrong, 2006 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 217, 243 (“No prior majority
opinion on the subject has suggested that in deciding whether conduct is expressive we should
look only at the conduct itself, rather than at both the conduct and the context in which it
occurs.”). But whether the focus is on conduct alone or conduct plus context, the key point is
that there must be meaningful expression.
47. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S.
405, 410–11 (1974) (per curiam)).
48. See Reply Comments of the National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n at 41–42,
Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905, 52 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) 1 (Dec. 21, 2010)
(report and order) (GN Docket No. 09-191), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/
view?id=7020437442 (“The same ‘it’s-just-transmission’ argument could be made . . . about
providers of cable service, given the fact that cable operators ultimately deliver the speech that
they have chosen to offer to their customers.”); Comments of Verizon & Verizon Wireless at
112, Preserving the Open Internet, 52 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) 1 (GN Docket No. 09-191),
available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020378523 (analogizing Internet
access providers to cable operators); LAURENCE H. TRIBE & THOMAS C. GOLDSTEIN,
PROPOSED “NET NEUTRALITY” MANDATES COULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AND VIOLATE
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3 (2009), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id
=7020375998 (same); supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text.
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and operators “see[k] to communicate messages on a wide variety of
49
topics and in a wide variety of formats.”

This passage is not consistent with the proposition that bare
transmission implicates the First Amendment. Otherwise, the Court
presumably would have said as much and let the matter rest there.
Instead, the Court stated that the First Amendment applied because
cable programmers and operators “engage in and transmit speech.”
The Court then further explicated that what made cable operators
speakers was their own programming and their practice of “exercising
editorial discretion” over which programs and stations to include (and
thus which to exclude), entailing their “‘see[king] to communicate
50
messages.’”
Note that nothing in any of this discussion depends on the
transmitter having the status of a common carrier. For transmission
qua transmission, it does not matter for First Amendment purposes
whether the entity engaging in that transmission is treated as a
common carrier. The points above would apply with equal force to an
entity that is not regarded as a common carrier that engaged in pure
transmission. So, for instance, in the previously discussed FedEx
51
example, FedEx would not have a First Amendment challenge to a
regulation banning discrimination whether it was formally treated as
a common carrier or not. The point about common carriage is that if
bare transmission were speech, then common carriers would be
engaged in speech. That is, a conclusion that mere transmission
implicated the First Amendment would apply to common carriage.
Other possible arguments that bit transmission constitutes
speech for First Amendment purposes depend on a prior decision
that transmission constitutes speech, and thus rely on, rather than
advance, the key assertion at issue here. One such argument is that
refusing to either favor or disfavor bits is speech under the First
Amendment. This argument flows from the fact that bit transmitters
have the technological ability to alter some of their transmissions if
they choose—to speed up, slow down, or block particular
transmissions. They may or may not bother to develop these

49. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994) (alteration in
original) (citation omitted) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc’ns, Inc., 476 U.S.
488, 494 (1986)). As the internal quotation indicates, the Court put forward the same test in City
of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986).
50. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 636 (quoting Preferred Commc’ns, 476 U.S. at 494).
51. See supra text accompanying note 36.
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capabilities, but the capabilities still exist. In light of these abilities, is
the decision not to utilize them a form of speech for First
Amendment purposes? The argument in support is fairly
straightforward: transmitters’ refusal to favor or disfavor bits is an
editorial choice that sends a message to the world, just as much as
sending an explicit announcement would.
The problem with this argument can be seen by taking it out of
the context of bits. Imagine that some carriers of oil or gas gave
preferential service to some companies’ oil or gas, and other oil or gas
carriers treated all companies’ oil or gas equally, with no favor or
disfavor toward any company’s products. Both sets of carriers would
be making choices that could be construed as communicating a
message—“We give preferential treatment” versus “We treat every
molecule of oil/gas the same”—but one would not treat either set of
carriers’ actions as implicating the First Amendment. Or, to put the
point differently, if courts treated the First Amendment as applicable
here, then the First Amendment would apply to every regulation.
After all, a company could always claim that each of its practices
communicates a message, and so any interference with any of its
practices would interfere with its speech. Such an interpretation of
the freedom of speech borders on the farcical, as it would be hard to
imagine what the First Amendment would not apply to.
The point is that in order to treat a decision not to discriminate
as triggering the First Amendment, the underlying activity must be
speech. If transmitting bits were speech under the First Amendment,
then refusing to give preferential treatment would also be speech.
Nothing about a refusal to discriminate advances the argument that
transmitting bits is speech. The status of the underlying activity as
speech is necessary (but not sufficient) for a refusal to discriminate to
fall within the freedom of speech.
This discussion demonstrates the problems with two closely
related arguments—that the decision not to favor or disfavor bits is a
form of silence under the First Amendment, and that forcing
companies to carry bits they do not wish to carry is a form of
52
compelled speech. The argument based on silence is simply another
form of the argument just discussed. Characterizing the refusal to
discriminate as silence instead of speech does not change the analysis:
52. See, e.g., May, supra note 22, at 202 (“Because neutrality mandates invariably require
ISPs to send or post content which the ISPs might prefer not to send or post, they are, in effect,
speech restrictions that infringe the ISPs’ constitutional rights.”).
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silence can trigger the First Amendment only in the context of
speech. The example regarding transmitters of oil or gas applies here
as well. Or, to give a different illustration, a widget monopolist that
chooses to be silent in response to other companies’ requests to use
its services cannot plausibly claim that its silence is speech under the
First Amendment, any more than it could claim that its affirmative
attempts to harm competition are speech under the First
Amendment. Silence, standing alone, does not trigger First
Amendment scrutiny. The relevant nonsilent activity must be speech
in order for its absence—the silence—to constitute speech under the
First Amendment. These arguments similarly apply to any suggestion
of compelled speech. No transmitter of oil or gas could plausibly
assert that being forced to carry some companies’ oil or gas is
compelled speech. As with the two arguments just discussed in the
silence context, a claim of compelled speech depends on a prior
53
decision that the bit transmitters are in fact speakers.
B. Conceptions of the First Amendment and Pure Transmission
The discussion in Section A focuses on considerations that courts
have traditionally emphasized in free speech analysis. It leaves out a
major focus of some scholars—normative conceptions of the best way
to understand the First Amendment. Scholars have put forward
different underlying theories of the First Amendment—visions about
what the freedom of speech really means and therefore how it should
be understood. The main conceptions that have been offered over the
years are the marketplace of ideas, the search for truth, the
government-checking
function,
self-government,
democratic
54
deliberation, personal autonomy, and individual self-expression.
53. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 63–64
(2006) (“The compelled-speech violation in each of our prior cases, however, resulted from the
fact that the complaining speaker’s own message was affected by the speech it was forced to
accommodate. . . . In this case, accommodating the military’s message does not affect the law
schools’ speech, because the schools are not speaking when they host interviews and recruiting
receptions.”).
54. On self-government and democratic deliberation, see generally ALEXANDER
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948); ROBERT C.
POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 119–78 (1995);
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993); and Harry
Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “the Central Meaning of the First
Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191. On the marketplace of ideas, see Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes,
J., dissenting); and JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9–10 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett
Publ’g Co. 1978) (1859). On the search for truth, see generally William P. Marshall, In Defense
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All these conceptions would agree on a core that the freedom of
55
speech would include—most notably political speech. But the
different theories lead to quite different conclusions about what the
freedom of speech would exclude. For example, theories based on
self-government or democratic deliberation would not include
pornography or commercial advertising within the ambit of the First
Amendment,
the
search-for-truth
theory would
exclude
communications with no truth value, and a desire to check the
government would not justify including speech that has nothing
56
whatever to do with governance.
The transmission of bits is a rare example of a speech-related
activity that all these conceptions of the freedom of speech would
exclude. That is, each one of these approaches would agree that a
company’s nondiscriminatory transmission should not be treated as
speech under the First Amendment. The theory that would sweep the
most within the freedom of speech is the marketplace of ideas.
Whereas other theories indicate particular purposes that the First
of the Search for Truth as a First Amendment Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1 (1995). On
autonomy, see generally C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 194–
224 (1989); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875 (1994); and
Harry H. Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105 (1979). On the checking
function, see generally Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521. On self-expression, see generally MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS (1984); and David A.J. Richards, Free Speech and
Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1974).
No theory has been widely accepted as explaining or driving First Amendment doctrine. See,
e.g., EMERSON, supra note 12, at vii (“Despite the mounting number of decisions and an even
greater volume of comment, no really adequate or comprehensive theory of the First
Amendment has been enunciated, much less agreed upon.”); DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 6 (2d ed. 2002) (“For a while there was a trend toward single-value theories of
First Amendment law, in which a scholar would posit a single underlying constitutional value
and then attempt to deduce all First Amendment doctrine from that value. Such efforts,
whatever their merits, never seemed to persuade many other scholars and were almost entirely
ignored by the courts.”).
55. See Lillian R. BeVier, On the Enduring Dilemma of Judicial Review, 39 EMORY L.J.
1229, 1238–39 (1990) (“[T]here is consensus that political speech is at the amendment’s core.
Even today, however, there is no agreement about the periphery, about the other kinds of
speech the amendment protects and why. Nor is there consensus yet about the underlying
rationale for the protection of political speech.”); see also MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 54, at 26
(“[T]he vital point, as stated negatively, is that no suggestion of policy shall be denied a hearing
because it is on one side of the issue rather than another.”); Bork, supra note 30, at 26 (stating
that the First Amendment protects only “explicitly and predominantly political speech”); Paul
B. Stephan III, The First Amendment and Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L. REV. 203, 207–08
(1982) (stating that “the central meaning of the First Amendment lies in its protection of debate
of public issues”).
56. Schauer, supra note 2, at 1785–86.
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Amendment should serve, this theory posits that all ideas should be
treated as part of the freedom of speech, and listeners (constituting
the marketplace for those ideas) can evaluate them. The marketplace
theory is sometimes criticized for bringing too much within the ambit
of the freedom of speech—it would protect ideas no matter how
57
repulsive, irrelevant to important values, or crassly commercial.
Indeed, a key facet (and, for many theorists, attraction) of the other
conceptions of speech is that they would not indiscriminately protect
all ideas, but instead would encompass those that advance the
relevant purpose (for example, democratic deliberation).
Holding the marketplace of ideas aside for the moment, a
company’s nondiscriminatory transmission does not meet any of the
purposes that theorists have laid out; nondiscriminatory transmission
has no content, so it does nothing to enhance democratic deliberation,
check the government, or meet any of the other stated purposes.
Transmission can enable democratic deliberation and personal
autonomy, but so can roads and public transportation. Transmission,
58
after all, is just a form of transportation. The idea behind these
conceptions of speech is that there is some content that should be
included in (and protected by) the First Amendment in order to
preserve democratic deliberation or personal autonomy, and a
company’s nondiscriminatory transmission does not qualify.
The marketplace of ideas casts its net more widely by refusing to
find some ideas more valuable than others, but it is still a marketplace
of ideas. The proposition is that the government should not pass
judgment among competing ideas, but should instead let them

57. See, e.g., Jeannine Bell, O Say, Can You See: Free Expression by the Light of Fiery
Crosses, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 335, 339 (2004) (arguing that the marketplace of ideas
paradigm overprotects hate speech).
58. In some situations a regulation of specific kinds of transportation may be an attempt to
suppress content and thus implicate the freedom of speech. Imagine a statute that prohibited
use of the roads for political purposes. This is the theory behind the application of the First
Amendment to regulations of campaign expenditures and contributions: when the government
limits the use of money to pay for political speech, it is singling out for regulation one of many
inputs into speech. The point of the jurisprudence is not that money equals speech, but that
regulations aimed at political speech implicate the First Amendment, even when they target an
input of speech rather than the speech itself. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976) (“[T]his
Court has never suggested that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of
money operates itself to introduce a nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny
required by the First Amendment.”); Eugene Volokh, Why Buckley v. Valeo Is Basically Right,
34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1095, 1101 (2002) (“Money isn’t speech. But restricting speech that uses money
is a speech restriction.”). This is quite different from a law prohibiting discrimination in the
transmission of bits, which of course does not target content in any way.
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compete. But what are competing are different ideas. And the point
made in the previous paragraph applies here as well: a company’s
nondiscriminatory transportation (of bits or anything else) enables
communication, but it has no content, and thus expresses no ideas.
C. Confidence
The argument that transmission qua transmission triggers the
First Amendment is thus weak. But one could make the following
counterargument to the analysis presented in this Part: a company’s
transmission of bits is its transmission of “speech” under the First
Amendment, and thus is part of “the freedom of speech.” This
creates a strong presumption that the Free Speech Clause applies to
any regulation of transmitters. There is no Supreme Court case that
overcomes that presumption, nor do any of the other points
marshalled in this Part. After all, the Supreme Court has never held
that a transmitter is not covered by the First Amendment. Indeed, the
Court has never even held that common carriage is not part of the
freedom of speech. Courts and commentators have long treated
common carriage as not implicating the First Amendment, but those
views were ill-considered or wrong—common carriers are engaged in
speech for purposes of the First Amendment. Yes, the Court’s
language in Turner I describing why cable operators are speakers is
hard to explain if the Court believes that transmission alone turns
cable operators into speakers, but (so the argument would go) that is
not enough to defeat the hypothetically strong presumption arising
from the text of the Free Speech Clause. Thus the presumption
created by the text of the First Amendment has not been overcome,
and a company’s transmission is best understood as part of the
freedom of speech.
The key move in the last paragraph is the presumption that
transmission is speech. Absent fairly broad agreement about
interpretive modalities or dispositive legal sources squarely on point,
defaults and presumptions can do a tremendous amount of work.

59. Robert Post argues that communication of ideas is necessary but not sufficient under
the marketplace of ideas. See Post, supra note 12, at 2366 (“It is . . . inaccurate to infer that the
theory of the marketplace of ideas requires that the First Amendment protect all speech that
communicates ideas. Instead, the theory requires the protection only of speech that
communicates ideas and that is embedded in the kinds of social practices that produce truth.”).
But communication of ideas is a sine qua non.
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Does this mean that one cannot say anything about the coverage
of the First Amendment beyond the trivial (for example, that murder
is not speech)? That one cannot, as a competent legal analyst, identify
one side of the argument as more persuasive than the other? I do not
think so. I think the argument on one side is stronger. But if I ask
instead my level of confidence in that position, and in particular
whether I can rule out the contrary position, that is a quite different
matter. Of course, this is not unique to transmission and speech:
interpretive claims that are truly beyond the pale are few and far
between, because some interpretive modality can support most any
proposition. That may be a source of concern—and indeed,
embarrassment—for lawyers and legal scholars, but addressing that
issue is not my project here. My point, rather, is that I cannot rule out
the arguments for transmission constituting the freedom of speech,
but I can say that the arguments for that position are weak, and the
arguments against it are strong.
This is not the end of the story, however, because one must still
ask what beyond bare transmission constitutes speech for First
Amendment purposes. I turn now to that issue.
III. EDITING AND COMMUNICATING
The previous Part indicates that a company’s bare transmission is
not speech for First Amendment purposes, so regulations prohibiting
discrimination in transmission do not, without more, trigger
application of the Free Speech Clause. But Internet access providers
may want to engage in various forms of manipulation of the bits that
they transmit. What forms of such manipulation would constitute
speech that implicates the Free Speech Clause?
A. Broadly Accepted Sources and Forms of Reasoning
We can start with the Supreme Court, which has proffered an
answer to this question. As I noted above, in Turner I the Court
concluded that cable programmers and operators engage in speech.
The reason, according to the Court, is that “[t]hrough ‘original
programming or by exercising editorial discretion over which stations
or programs to include in its repertoire,’ cable programmers and

BENJAMIN IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC

4/14/2011 6:03:53 PM

2011] TRANSMISSION AND THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH

1697

operators ‘see[k] to communicate messages on a wide variety of
60
topics and in a wide variety of formats.’”
Does this do any work? Yes. This reasoning presents two
elements: first, that cable programmers and operators either create
programming or choose what to air; and, second, that in doing so they
seek to communicate messages on a variety of topics. The Court does
not state explicitly that both elements are required, but the structure
of the sentence so suggests, and, more importantly, having one
without the other would not seem to constitute speech. The notion of
seeking to communicate without actually editing or creating anything
runs into the problem discussed in the previous Part: a company, in
refusing to discriminate among the bits that it transmits, may seek to
communicate a message (e.g., “We do not discriminate among bits”),
but it is hard to see how it has engaged in speech. Otherwise, common
carriers could say that they are speakers simply because they have not
sought to discriminate (by challenging the regulations applicable to
them). Indeed, one could imagine a wonderful form of bootstrapping:
a common carrier challenging a regulation prohibiting discrimination
as invalid under the First Amendment, and the First Amendment
applying because the common carrier engaged in speech by refraining
from challenging its regulation. As to the converse possibility, one
could imagine editing that does not seek to communicate. Consider a
computer editing function that automatically replaces words of eight
or more letters with shorter synonyms, as a way of reducing the
number of pages in a document without changing its substance. This
would not only be a pretty terrible editor, but also one that is not
communicating anything by its editing. There would be editing but no
communication and thus no speech for First Amendment purposes.
It may be that the real communication of every company in every
decision it makes is “We want to make money.” Indeed, for a
company that is a faithful agent, with shareholders who want the
highest possible return, one would expect that everything it did was
done in order to maximize shareholder value. But the point of free
speech jurisprudence is that some of those company decisions entail a
substantive communication—whatever the real motivation may have
been—and others do not.
The formulation from Turner I comports with theory and
practice. The Court and theorists have always required substantive
60. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994) (quoting City of
Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc’ns, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986) (alteration in original)).
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communication or self-expression as a requirement for the
61
application of the First Amendment. In every case in which the
Court has applied the First Amendment, abridgement of substantive
62
communication has been the issue. Some of those abridgements are
61. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1956) (stating that the First
Amendment “was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
political and social changes desired by the people”); SCHAUER, supra note 7, at 94
(“Communication dominates all the arguments that would with any plausibility generate a Free
Speech Principle.”); Steven G. Gey, Why Should the First Amendment Protect Government
Speech When the Government Has Nothing to Say?, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1259, 1274 (2010) (“The
Supreme Court has been very clear about the First Amendment requirement that speakers must
engage in definitive communication before receiving constitutional protection for speech.”);
Frederick Schauer, Speech and “Speech”—Obscenity and “Obscenity”: An Exercise in the
Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899, 920 (1979) (“The Court is saying
that the communication of ideas is at once the essential first amendment purpose and the
essential first amendment property.”).
One might reasonably ask what work “self-expression” is doing in the formulation in
the text, on the assumption that self-expression is a substantive communication. Adding “selfexpression” clarifies the inclusion of forms of expression that have been recognized as
implicating the freedom of speech even though they arguably do not entail a clear substantive
communication—in particular, recognized forms of art and symbolism. See Hurley v. Irish-Am.
Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) (“The protected expression
that inheres in a parade is not limited to its banners and songs, however, for the Constitution
looks beyond written or spoken words as mediums of expression. Noting that ‘[s]ymbolism is a
primitive but effective way of communicating ideas,’ our cases have recognized that the First
Amendment shields such acts as saluting a flag (and refusing to do so), wearing an armband to
protest a war, displaying a red flag, and even ‘[m]arching, walking or parading’ in uniforms
displaying the swastika. As some of these examples show, a narrow, succinctly articulable
message is not a condition of constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions
conveying a ‘particularized message,’ would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of
Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.”
(alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 632 (1943); Nat’l Socialist Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 43 (1977)
(per curiam); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974) (per curiam))). One may
reasonably contend that works of art and symbolism, and self-expression more generally, do
entail a substantive communication, so adding “or self-expression” in fact adds nothing to the
category of “substantive communication.” I include both terms only in an excess of caution, to
ensure that I have included everything that has been treated as part of the freedom of speech.
Even if “self-expression” does add something to “substantive communication,” it does
not do so in the context of Internet access providers. It seems safe to say that Internet access
providers do not produce works of art or symbolism, and it is difficult to imagine what activities
of an Internet access provider could constitute “self-expression” but not “substantive
communication.” (Indeed, one may fairly claim that no activity of an Internet access provider
could be self-expression, but that is a stronger claim that is not necessary for this argument.) For
ease of exposition, I will simply refer to substantive communication in the remainder of this
Article, given that “self-expression” may not add anything and, in any event, does not add
anything in terms of the activities in which Internet access providers engage.
62. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 66
(2005) (noting that the Supreme Court has “extended First Amendment protection only to
conduct that is inherently expressive”); Spence, 418 U.S. at 409 (finding that the display of an
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content neutral, but the key is that they are interfering with a person’s
or entity’s ability to communicate content. The touchstone of the
Court’s First Amendment cases has always been that the underlying
activity entails an expression of ideas, even if it is not “a narrow,
63
succinctly articulable message.”
This does not mean that the bar for exercising editorial
discretion and “‘see[king] to communicate messages on a wide variety
of topics’” is high in this formulation. After all, cable operators
generally do not have an all-encompassing philosophy that they are
64
trying to foist on their viewers. But in choosing among possible
channels, they are choosing to offer subscribers some perspectives of
the world (e.g., Fox News, MSNBC, and C-SPAN) and not others
(e.g., Al Jazeera or Mexico’s equivalent of C-SPAN).
This dovetails with Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and
65
Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc. In that case, the Court ruled that
regulation of Boston’s St. Patrick’s Day parade triggered the First
Amendment, because the parade was speech for First Amendment
66
purposes. The Court, in rejecting the argument that a parade was
“merely ‘a conduit’ for the speech of participants in the parade
‘rather than itself the speaker,’” stated that “the parade does not
consist of individual, unrelated segments that happen to be
transmitted together for individual selection by members of the
audience. Although each parade unit generally identifies itself, each is
67
understood to contribute something to a common theme.” The
Court explained that, “[r]ather like a composer, the Council [running
the parade] selects the expressive units of the parade from potential
participants, and though the score may not produce a particularized
message, each contingent’s expression in the Council’s eyes comports
68
with what merits celebration on that day.” The parade did not have
a single, clear message, but—to use the parlance of Turner I—the
parade’s organizers did exercise editorial discretion through which
they sought to communicate messages.
American flag with peace symbols was an activity “sufficiently imbued with elements of
communication to fall within the scope of the First and Fourth Amendments”).
63. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569.
64. The closest thing to a coherent message would be “Cable television service is worth
every penny you’re paying for it.”
65. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
66. Id. at 568–69.
67. Id. at 576.
68. Id. at 574.
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First Amendment theory leads to the same conclusion as the
Court’s jurisprudence. As I already noted, there is no broad
agreement on the precise contours of what constitutes speech. Every
proffered definition of communication—and of the freedom of
speech—has its detractors.
But this disagreement should not obscure two larger points. The
first is that every conception of the First Amendment requires some
69
substantive communication. The theories differ only as to which
sorts of communications the First Amendment should encompass and
protect. Even the conception that would cover the most forms of
communication—the marketplace of ideas—is still a marketplace of
ideas.
The other is that the legal community has a working definition of
communication that may be overinclusive, but that includes
everything courts and theorists have regarded as communication.
Communication seems to require, at a minimum, a speaker who
70
transmits some substantive message or messages to a listener who
71
can recognize that message. Conveying something other than a
substantive message—say, high frequency electromagnetic radiation
designed to destroy a building or smash atoms—is not speech. X-rays
are many things, but speech is not one of them. (Consider the
absurdity of an X-ray machine manufacturer challenging a regulation
of X-ray machines on the ground that regulating X-rays is regulating
speech.) Attempting to transmit a substantive message that is not
readily recognizable is not communication or speech, because the

69. See supra notes 59, 61 and accompanying text; see also Eugene Volokh, Speech as
Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering
Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1304 (2005) (“Under nearly
every theory of free speech, the right to free speech is at its core the right to communicate—to
persuade and to inform people through the content of one’s message.”).
70. In the remainder of this Article, I will use the term “message” to refer to one or more
messages for the sake of convenience and brevity, thereby avoiding the repetition of the
awkward “message or messages.”
71. See, e.g., Melville B. Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First
Amendment, 21 UCLA L. REV. 29, 36 (1973) (“Whatever else may or may not be true of speech,
as an irreducible minimum it must constitute a communication. That, in turn, implies both a
communicator and a communicatee—a speaker and an audience.”); KENT GREENAWALT,
SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 54 (1989) (“When the message is an aspect of
what the actor is trying to do and is understood by the audience as such, we can say comfortably
that the act communicates the message and that the free speech principle is relevant.”); Thomas
Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 206 (1972) (“[By] ‘acts
of expression’ . . . I mean to include any act that is intended by its agent to communicate to one
or more persons some proposition or attitude.”).
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message has not been communicated. A person who drinks milk out
of a sippy cup as a protest against government spending may have in
mind a message (e.g., the government is treating its citizens like
children), but she has failed to communicate it. Thus, in order to
communicate, one must have a message that is sendable and
receivable and that one actually sends. Put differently, there are three
basic questions: Is there a substantive message? Can it be sent and
received? Has it actually been sent? One who cannot check off those
boxes is not engaged in speech.
In some situations, the sending and receiving of the message is
obvious. Readers of newspapers understand that newspaper editors
have chosen the materials that the editors think are suitable. In other
situations, the issue is a bit more complex. In Turner I, the Supreme
Court suggested that cable subscribers understand both that cable
operators choose some of the channels that they carry and that for
other channels cable operators are mere conduits, not speakers. In yet
other situations, a substantive message would be sent only if the
editor effectively communicated its editorial stance to the users. A
cable operator that secretly blocked content for substantive reasons—
say, indecency, or positive references to its competitors—would be
engaged in substantive editing, but it would not have sent a message
to its users and thus would not have communicated that message.
The definition of communication above is overinclusive. As one
scholar has noted, this basic definition—which he summarizes as
“communicative acts are those intended to convey mental states and
performed in ways that are reasonably understood to be for that
purpose”—is a “‘coarse’ definition of communication, because it is
72
useful but overinclusive.” It would include everything typically
regarded as speech but also some things that are generally excluded
from speech, such as A taking a drug, trying to describe to B what its
effects feel like but failing, and then giving B some of the drug so that
B might share A’s state of mind. A giving the drug to B would seem to
satisfy the consensus definition of communication above, but most
73
judges and theorists would not regard it as speech. The
disagreements come into play when one considers what elements to
add to the bare-bones requirements.

72. John Greenman, On Communication, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1337, 1341 (2008).
73. Id. at 1341–42.
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B. How Far Can This Take the Analysis?
Let us see, though, how far we can get sticking with Turner I and
the overinclusive consensus definition of communication. Some
conceptions of the First Amendment would not treat the editorial
decisions of cable operators as speech, but I will treat that as settled
ground in light of Turner I. If Turner I and the broad understanding
of communication are a baseline, the First Amendment will
encompass some things that most scholars and courts would not
consider to be speech. But can we reach some useful conclusions
about what is covered by the Free Speech Clause? The short answer
is “yes.”
We can start with two guideposts. Turner I creates a lower
bound: whatever is equivalent to the sort of editing that Turner I
found sufficient, by hypothesis, and in reality as a jurisprudential
matter, constitutes speech for First Amendment purposes. The need
to give meaning to the words “communication” and “message” create
a second guidepost: we should reject any theory that turns every
business decision into one that satisfies the First Amendment. Such
an interpretation of the First Amendment borders on the absurd and
thus should be disfavored.
The first guidepost does some work. Creating one’s own
material, or substantively editing others’ material, will suffice under
the Turner I standard. A webpage that a company creates is speech
for purposes of the First Amendment. Note that this does not make
the company a speaker for all purposes: an oil-exploration company is
engaged in speech when it creates its webpage, but not when it drills
for oil. But creating a webpage is a core expressive activity and will
thus trigger the First Amendment. The same applies to substantively
editing others’ materials. For instance, an Internet access provider
that explicitly provided a substantively edited Internet experience
(e.g., a service that blocked access to indecent material and presented
itself as a “family friendly” offering) would be a speaker under
Turner I. By hypothesis, customers would understand that they were
being offered an edited service. Like cable operators, the Internet
access provider would be editing in a way that sought to communicate
messages, and those messages (because explicit) would be receivable
by the public. More generally, whenever an Internet access provider
is willing not only to substantively edit but also to make that editing
clear—“We block the content you don’t want” or “We edit the
Internet for you”—then it is engaged in speech for First Amendment
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purposes. Turner I also indicates that a webpage that is merely a
collection of links chosen by an editor for substantive reasons (like
the Drudge Report) will be speech for First Amendment purposes.
By the same token, many other activities will not meet the test
created by Turner I and the overinclusive definition of
communication. Transmissions can be manipulated and edited in
myriad ways, and many of those forms of manipulation and editing
will not communicate any substantive messages—or, in the language
of Turner I, will not “‘see[k] to communicate messages on a wide
74
variety of topics and in a wide variety of formats.’”
I will start with a basic form of manipulation that is particularly
attractive to broadband Internet access providers: giving better
service to an entity that pays more money and worse service to an
entity that pays less. If the word “communication” is to have any
meaningful content, this cannot qualify. Note that nothing about this
form of communication is related to what is being priced (bits, oil,
whatever). That is, the alleged communication would inhere in the
pricing itself. Finding that tiered pricing constitutes communication
verges on the absurd, as that would mean that virtually every business
practice is a form of speech under the First Amendment. It is the rare
business that does not give better service or products to an entity that
pays more money. To return to the FedEx example: just as one would
not claim that FedEx, in treating all mailings the same, was engaging
in speech, one also would not claim that FedEx, in providing slower
service for less money and faster service for more money, was
engaging in speech by differentiating among mailings. Indeed, under
this theory one could see prices of any sort as messages: the
dichotomy would simply be between “no service” (if one is not willing
to pay anything) and “some service” (if one is willing to pay
something). Thus merely having prices would be speech under the
First Amendment. And this principle would not be limited to
companies transmitting speech. If tiered pricing communicates a
message, it does so regardless of what is being priced. That is, if
providing better service to higher payers sends a message, then it
sends that message no matter what they are paying for. But if one
considers giving better service based on higher payments to constitute
communicating a message, that drains the words “communicate” and
“message” of virtually all meaning.
74. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994) (alteration in
original) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc’ns, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986)).
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What about other choices network operators may want to make?
In particular, optimizing a network for some modes of transmission is
a major category of manipulation that has been a focus of supporters
and opponents of net neutrality. Most obviously, if an Internet access
provider wants to prioritize the transmission of video, is that speech
for First Amendment purposes? Such issues of network and protocol
design arise frequently in networks. Telephone companies found that
they could upgrade and optimize their copper wires for Internet
service. The same is true for cable companies and their coaxial cables
and for direct broadcast satellite and their satellites. Cable companies
changed their network design and protocols to move from analog to
digital, and cellular telephony providers did the same. Cable and
satellite providers changed their networks to provide for high
definition transmissions. In making these decisions, did these
companies communicate and thus engage in speech under the First
Amendment? If the government had regulated any of these
transitions, would such regulations have implicated the companies’
First Amendment interests?
Designing a network to operate more efficiently, or to gain more
customers, would not constitute speech for First Amendment
purposes, because there would be no substantive communication.
Every network operator—indeed, every business—designs its
operations to run efficiently and gain customers. Treating this as
speech would turn every business decision into speech. The analysis
does not change if the Internet access provider not only optimizes for
efficiency and/or to gain customers but also so informs the world
through its advertising—e.g., “We have the best network for you” or
“We give you what you want.” There would be a signal sent to the
world, but there still would not be any substantive communication
(and, again, a contrary conclusion would turn every business decision
backed by advertising into a form of speech).
An Internet access provider could argue that, in optimizing one
mode of communication over another, it had a more specific message.
The choice entails a preference, and the preference entails a
communication. The Internet access provider might prefer video as
intrinsically better than other modes of communication, or might
prefer video because of the content it can offer—arguing, for
example, that video can present the world in ways that other modes
of communication cannot. One could further imagine that this
message is sent to the world via a motto—perhaps “Video is better
than text,” “We love video,” or “Video captures what is important.”
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The motto would be speech under the First Amendment, but
that does not transform the underlying activity into the freedom of
speech, any more than “Flame-broiled is better than fried” or “We
love flame-broiled” would transform cooking decisions into
expressive activity encompassed by the freedom of speech. As to the
underlying optimization for video: is that the same as the message in
Turner I? No. Cable operators’ choices among channels are choices
that entail content. And note that the cable operators in Turner I had
made a service-based choice in the design of their networks—they
chose to transmit television and not other forms of communication.
But the mere fact that they chose television service did not make
them speakers; their substantive editorial choices did.
Turner I did not, of course, explicitly state that choices among
modes of communication are not speech. But if preferring one mode
of communication to another is, or encodes, a substantive
communication, then every network design decision would be speech
under the First Amendment. Every mode of communication has some
advantages over others, such that one could say that the decision to
optimize for that mode of communication thereby makes it easier to
present information in a particular way. And every aspect of
networks—the protocols, the hardware, the software, etc.—makes
some communications easier relative to others. To pick one example,
every decision that reduces latency has particular benefits for the
transmission of video, and little benefit for modes of communication
that are not latency sensitive. The problem is that none of these
decisions entails a communication about content. Every mode of
communication has different properties (that is what makes them
different modes of communication), but that is totally separate from
having differences in content. Nothing in the modes themselves
entails such differences, and thus a choice among them is not a choice
about content. There is no substantive message communicated by a
network operator’s optimization for a particular mode of
communication.
If a network operator chose to optimize its network for messages
about politics (or golf), that might be a substantive communication.
Similarly, if it chose to give faster service to text messages on
particular subjects, that might be a substantive communication. But
choices among services do not entail substantive communications.
What about blocking material that the Internet access provider
deems harmful? The key, as the previous discussion suggests, is
whether the blocking entails a communication about content. In
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blocking, is the blocker making a substantive decision about what
content it wants to be associated with, and sending that message to its
users? Blocking for the sake of keeping the network running (for
example, blocking software that could bring down the network) is an
example of nonsubstantive editing. If that were considered
communication, then every action any network takes to protect
itself—including ensuring adequate power supplies or air
conditioning units—would be communication. But one can imagine
blocking in which the network operator is blocking for substantive
reasons and communicating those substantive reasons to its users.
Indeed, that characterizes the hypothetical of the family-friendly
service that blocks indecent material: the operator would be offering
a service that was edited for content and presented as such to the
public.
This does not necessarily mean that an editor must use a contentbased filter to engage in substantive editing. If, for example, a familyfriendly Internet service concluded that the vast majority of messages
emanating from a particular server, or sent to a particular port,
contained pornography, it might block all messages from that server
or to that port as part of its commitment to blocking indecency. The
reason for blocking would be content based. The filter would be a
proxy for content. But the filter itself would not be content based.
This leads to the last major form of arguable editing that Internet
access providers engage in: the blocking of spam and malware. Is such
blocking covered by the Free Speech Clause? Before considering that
question, one might want to ask whether anything turns on the
answer. The net neutrality regulations allow Internet access providers
to block spam and malware, and it is extremely unlikely that the
government will ever regulate this aspect of Internet access providers’
behavior. This means that, whether or not blocking spam and
malware is part of the freedom of speech, it is extremely unlikely that
the government will restrict Internet access providers’ ability to
engage in that activity. Does this render irrelevant the question
whether blocking spam and malware constitutes speech?
The basic argument on each side is reasonably straightforward. If
being a speaker for one purpose makes one a speaker for all
purposes, then as soon as an Internet access provider engages in one
form of speech, all its activities would be covered by the Free Speech
Clause. The counterargument is that the First Amendment is framed
in terms of speech, and the relevant question is whether a particular
regulation abridges the freedom of speech. If the legal regime leaves
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the speech acts of an entity untouched, then regulation of the entity’s
other acts does not implicate the Free Speech Clause.
The broadest version of the argument that one is a speaker for
all purposes seems wrong. As I already noted, a company is a speaker
for purposes of its advertisements, but that does not mean that what it
is advertising is speech or that the company is a speaker for all
purposes. A narrower version of the argument is that any regulation
related to the conduct giving rise to speech is a regulation of the
freedom of speech. But that still leaves the question of what relation
is actually required.
The Supreme Court has applied laws of general applicability to
75
speakers and held that they do not raise First Amendment issues.
But what about more specific laws that single out speakers without
directly regulating their speech? The most relevant line of cases
involves taxation of speakers. In Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v.
76
Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, the Court held the First
Amendment applicable to taxation that discriminated among print
77
publications. A few years later, in Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v.
78
Ragland, the Court suggested that any law that singled out a set of
speakers for special treatment was subject to First Amendment
79
80
scrutiny. But in Leathers v. Medlock, the Court held that First
Amendment review applies only to differential taxation schemes that
threaten to suppress the expression of particular ideas or viewpoints,
target a small group of speakers, or discriminate based on the content
81
of speech. Leathers stated that “differential taxation of speakers,
even members of the press, does not implicate the First Amendment
75. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991) (“[G]enerally applicable laws
do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has
incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news.”); Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1945) (applying generally applicable antitrust laws to a company’s
core First Amendment activities); see also Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 7 (“The fact that the
publisher handles news while others handle food does not . . . afford the publisher a peculiar
constitutional sanctuary in which he can with impunity violate laws regulating his business
practices.”).
76. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
77. Id. at 592–93.
78. Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
79. Id. at 228; see also Turner I, 512 U.S. at 640–41 (“[L]aws that single out the press, or
certain elements thereof, for special treatment ‘pose a particular danger of abuse by the State,’
and so are always subject to at least some degree of heightened First Amendment scrutiny.”
(quoting Ark. Writers’ Project, 481 U.S. at 228)).
80. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991).
81. Id. at 447.
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unless the tax is directed at, or presents the danger of suppressing,
82
particular ideas.”
The D.C. Circuit, meanwhile, has treated all regulations of cable
operators as raising First Amendment issues. Some of these
regulations directly relate to the speech in which cable operators
83
engage. Requiring cable operators to set aside some of their capacity
for public, educational, and governmental channels, and for stations
subject to leased access, for instance, could reduce the number of
channels over which cable operators can exercise editorial control
and thus limit their ability to engage in speech for First Amendment
84
purposes. Similarly, if the blocking of spam and malware were
speech and a regulation had the effect of preventing an Internet
access provider from engaging in such blocking, that regulation would
reduce the ability of an Internet access provider to engage in speech.
Other regulations that the D.C. Circuit has subjected to First
Amendment scrutiny have no direct connection to the cable
operators’ editing. The best example is the regulation of the rates that
cable companies can charge to their customers. The D.C. Circuit, with
little discussion, held that such regulation is subject to First
85
Amendment scrutiny. And the nexus between rate regulation and
cable operators’ exercise of editorial discretion is not obvious. One
could argue that rate regulation reduces revenues, and that having
less revenue limits the ability of a cable operator to produce the
86
content it wants and to exercise editorial discretion as it sees fit. But
this would suggest that virtually every regulation that specifically
applies to a company engaged in speech will be subject to First

82. Id. at 453.
83. For example, the vertical concentration limits, which limit the percentage of channels in
which a cable operator has an ownership interest that it can include in its lineup, constrain
operators’ choices of which channels to air. See 47 U.S.C. § 533(f)(1)(B) (2006) (“[The FCC]
shall establish[] reasonable limits on the number of channels on a cable system that can be
occupied by a video programmer in which a cable operator has an attributable interest . . . .”);
Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (applying First
Amendment scrutiny to rules promulgated under § 533(f)(1)(B)).
84. See Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding that
such regulation could present First Amendment issues, but rejecting a facial challenge to the
particular statute at issue).
85. Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 151, 181–82 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
86. See Christopher S. Yoo, Architectural Censorship and the FCC, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 669,
687 (2005) (contending that “rate regulation had the unintended consequence of degrading the
quality of existing cable offerings and foreclosing the emergence of higher quality channel
packages despite viewers’ willingness to pay for them”).
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Amendment scrutiny, because almost any regulation can have the
effect of reducing revenue.
Unfortunately for this Article’s purposes, the Supreme Court has
not considered cases involving the rate regulation of cable television
service or other regulations that have no more connection to speech
87
than would any ordinary regulation. That is, every regulation to
which the Court has applied First Amendment scrutiny has had some
additional element, and thus the Court has never considered the
applicability of the First Amendment to a regulation whose only
connection to speech is that it is not of general applicability and
applies to an entity that engages in speech. And, needless to say,
different conceptions of the First Amendment would treat these
regulations differently. Conceptions focusing on autonomy and selfexpression, for example, would reject as ridiculous the application of
the First Amendment to economic regulation of companies engaged
in speech. The absence of Supreme Court case law or conceptual
agreement is unfortunate for my purposes because, in this Article, I
want to see how far we can go based on broadly accepted sources and
forms of reasoning. And with respect to generic regulations of
speakers—that is, regulations that are not directly connected to the
conduct giving rise to speech and that betray no censorious goals, no
preference for content, and no desire to squelch particular speakers—
there seem to be no broadly accepted sources, reasoning, or
conclusions.
I do want to note, however, the connection between this
discussion and the previous Parts of the Article. There are two lines
at issue—one between speech and nonspeech, and another between

87. The Supreme Court has invalidated statutes giving local officials authority to permit or
ban distribution of newspapers and other forms of speech, but those cases focus on the
possibility of content and viewpoint discrimination created by unbridled discretion to permit or
ban. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 767–68 (1988) (“[T]his
Court has long been sensitive to the special dangers inherent in a law placing unbridled
discretion directly to license speech, or conduct commonly associated with speech, in the hands
of a government official.”); see also Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948) (“When a city
allows an official to ban [loud-speakers] in his uncontrolled discretion, it sanctions a device for
suppression of free communication of ideas.”); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450–51
(1938) (invalidating a regulation prohibiting the distribution of leaflets without the approval of
the city manager). Indeed, in Lakewood the Court stated,
This is not to say that the press or a speaker may challenge as censorship any law
involving discretion to which it is subject. The law must have a close enough nexus to
expression, or to conduct commonly associated with expression, to pose a real and
substantial threat of the identified censorship risks.
Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 759.
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regulations of conceded speakers that do not implicate the First
Amendment and regulations of speakers that do implicate the First
Amendment. The further the second line is pushed toward the
application of First Amendment scrutiny to all regulation, the greater
the pressure on the first line. Consider, for example, the significance
of a conclusion that mere transmission is part of the freedom of
speech, combined with a conclusion that the First Amendment
applies to all specific regulations that reduce the speaker’s revenues.
Under such a scenario, all regulations specifically applicable not only
to common carriers but also to carriers like FedEx would be subject
to First Amendment scrutiny. This does not make either of these
conclusions wrong, but it does highlight what is at stake.
To return now to the blocking of spam and malware: one cannot
say with confidence what, if anything, turns on the question whether
the blocking of spam and malware is part of the freedom of speech.
The net neutrality regulations impose no direct burden on such
blocking. The regulations require nondiscrimination but specifically
allow the blocking of spam and malware. But, insofar as it reduces the
revenues of Internet access providers, a nondiscrimination regime
may at the margin reduce providers’ ability to invest in spam-blocking
software. This is a pretty tenuous connection, but as the previous
discussion indicates, I do not think we can safely reject it.
Assuming that the question is relevant, does blocking spam and
malware constitute communication, and therefore speech for First
Amendment purposes? It depends. As I have already explained, a
transmitter protecting its own network is engaged in nonsubstantive
editing. But protecting users from receiving material that they want to
avoid is substantive editing. It may be that the transmitter’s filter is
content neutral, but if its reason for blocking the content is
substantive, then it is engaged in substantive editing. And if the
transmitter communicates such substantive blocking to its users, that
would seem to satisfy the requirements for communication and thus
for the freedom of speech.
This means that, to determine whether the First Amendment
applies to an Internet access provider’s decision to block spam and
malware, a court must determine both why the provider engaged in
such blocking and, if there were substantive reasons, whether it
actually communicated its substantive reasons to its users. In giving
meaning to the application of the Free Speech Clause to purported
speech, an adjudicator will have to determine if communication is at
issue, and communication will often be context specific. To see if a
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substantive message has been sent and received, a court must
determine whether a message was substantive and examine the means
by which it was sent.
Is this a recipe for disaster, in that it requires courts to make
determinations about both the existence of substantive editorial
decisions and the communication of those decisions to the public?
Perhaps, but courts make similar decisions all the time. It may be that
they make them poorly and that the law should favor more easily
administrable tests, but that is an issue that transcends the
considerations addressed in this Article.
To return to the question at hand: is the blocking of spam and
malware speech for First Amendment purposes? As the prior
discussion indicates, we cannot answer that question without knowing
more. Depending on why it is done and how it is communicated, such
blocking may or may not be speech under the First Amendment.
Does the provider block solely to keep its network running
efficiently, or also because it believes that its customers do not want
the blocked content? If it blocks for substantive reasons (such as to
protect its customers from content they do not want), does it
communicate that to customers? Does it advertise itself as a company
that “blocks material that you would not like” (or words to that
effect)?
C. Confidence Redux
It turns out, then, that Turner I plus an overinclusive definition
of communication can take the analysis reasonably far, although it
still falls short of definitively resolving the question whether Internet
access providers’ actions implicate the Free Speech Clause. That final
answer will depend on highly fact-specific and contextual
determinations.
How would the answers differ if one were to resolve the
questions I left unresolved—involving what conception of the Free
Speech Clause, and what specific definition of communication, one
should adopt? Would adopting a specific conception and a specific
definition provide different answers to the questions addressed in the
previous Parts? Yes, but only in the direction of finding that less of
the Internet access providers’ activity is speech under the First
Amendment. The reasoning I have employed relies on a broadly
shared baseline that is overinclusive. None of the conceptions of the
freedom of speech or the potential definitions of communication
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would find the Free Speech Clause applicable to more decisions by
network operators than this Article’s discussion suggests. Some
conceptions of the Free Speech Clause, and some definitions of
communication, would encompass fewer decisions by network
operators than Turner I and the broad definition of communication
88
would encompass.
If we are not prepared to limit or cabin Turner I, then adopting a
particular conception of the Free Speech Clause and/or a particular
definition of communication might affect only the question whether
blocking spam and malware constitutes part of the freedom of speech.
It would not change the answers to any of the other questions
discussed. It might change the rationales for the other answers, and
the confidence one has in those answers, but the answers themselves
would remain the same.
That said, adopting a conception of the Free Speech Clause
and/or a definition of communication more precise than the one
outlined in this Part would allow for more precision and more
confidence. This is not surprising. The greater the agreement on how
one interprets an area of law, the greater the likelihood of having
confidence in a given conclusion. There would still be limits to this
confidence, of course—none of the proffered conceptions or
definitions of communication admits of high levels of clarity. But if,
for instance, we were to decide that the First Amendment is focused
on individual self-expression or personal autonomy, we would
conclude with great confidence that it would not cover the claims of
any company engaged in transmission.
The analysis in this Part is contingent on Supreme Court case law
that could change and a definition of communication that is by no
means incontestable. But incontestability is an unrealistic standard.
The point of the analysis in Parts II and III is that, even without more
specific agreement, scholars can have reasonable confidence about
most of the potential speech issues raised by net neutrality
regulations.

88. If, for example, free speech, properly understood, is about individual self-expression or
personal autonomy, then decisions by a corporation do not qualify because there is no
individual self-expression or personal autonomy involved. See supra note 61 and accompanying
text.
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CONCLUSION
First Amendment analysis is notoriously open-ended and
dependent on the conception of the freedom of speech that one
adopts. The aim of this Article has been to consider whether a basic
legal toolkit and broadly shared principles can produce useful
answers to some questions about what the freedom of speech
encompasses, focusing on the nondiscrimination principles arising out
of net neutrality rules. One way of understanding this analysis is as
addressing the extent to which lawyers who do not have a shared
conception of the First Amendment can use conventional legal
analysis to determine what the freedom of speech encompasses. And
one could substitute “the Supreme Court” for “lawyers” in the
previous sentence.
The point of this Article is that we can start from broadly shared
premises and reach conclusions in which we can be reasonably
confident. We will never reach unanimity or certainty. That is
probably too tall a task for a field as mushy as law. But I believe we
can reach a level of reasonable confidence. We do not have to wait
for word from on high—or from the nearest thing in the lawyer’s
universe, the Supreme Court—to find meaningful guidance.

